Iran’s nuclear obstacles were more diplomatic than technical. then the bombs started falling

Nuclear weapons experts are warning that the US-Israeli war on Iran, ostensibly launched to prevent the country from acquiring nuclear weapons, may instead lead to an Iranian bomb.

That’s because before the war, Iran was restrained not by technical barriers but by diplomatic reasons, say two nuclear weapons experts who were involved in previous US efforts to impose sanctions and control the country.

Those diplomatic calculations have changed.

The consequences that Iran tried for years to avoid – the bombing of its cities, the assassination of its senior leadership, the destruction of its air force and navy – have now occurred.

Scientists say the focus on preventing Iran from enriching uranium, often referred to as “weapons grade,” has obscured the fact that Iran don’t have to get The level of enrichment seen in sophisticated nuclear weapons produced by superpowers to create a terrifying bomb.

Physicist Steve Fetter, a member of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control, says Iran’s estimated 440 kilograms of 60 percent enriched material “is already directly usable for making nuclear weapons.”

Fetter led the National Security and International Affairs Division of the White House Office of Science under US President Barack Obama and was involved in the nuclear deal signed with Iran – which was torn up by President Donald Trump in his first term.

‘Breakout time’ is probably short

Tara Drozdenko, a plasma physicist who worked on nuclear weapons issues for the U.S. Navy and State Department and served in the Obama and George W. Bush administrations, agreed, saying, “You could probably make a weapon — quite large and crude — at 60 percent enrichment.”

“It’s going to be much heavier and bigger, because you’ll need more uranium to get a sustained chain reaction.”

Drozdenko has extensive experience dealing with proliferation issues. He led the Country/Regime Sanctions Unit at the U.S. Treasury Department from 2008 to 2012, where he managed more than 20 U.S. government economic sanctions programs, including against Iran and North Korea.

He also represented the United States at NATO’s Senior Group on Proliferation.

Drozdenko says Iran decided to cap its enrichment at 60 percent for political rather than technical reasons.

“If that was their objective, they could have continued to enrich it to a greater extent,” he said.

Most efforts at uranium enrichment are in the early stages. As more non-fissionable material is removed from the uranium in the centrifuge, enrichment becomes faster and easier. Getting from 3.67 percent to 10 percent requires far more time and effort than getting from 10 percent to 90 percent—which is considered weapons grade.

Experts say with Iran already sitting at 60 percent, its “breakout time” to reach weapons grade is short.

The United States and Israel bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities last year – as Trump said at the time The capacity to govern was “destroyed”.

Some believe that Iranian enriched uranium reserves are now buried under debris.

Fetter agrees that even if air strikes were successful in destroying all of Iran’s centrifuges, progress toward higher enrichment would slow rather than stop, until even existing nuclear material becomes inaccessible.

“Iran clearly has the expertise to make centrifuges in a small facility, and they would only need a small facility to enrich that material if they had access to fully weapons grade.”

Fetter says the bomb design Iran will aim for is “a gun-type device, the type of device the US used on Hiroshima,” which is “simple and easily within the range of Iranian scientists and engineers.”

That bomb used a conventional-explosive “gun” to detonate a block of 80 percent enriched uranium-235 into another block, creating the critical mass needed for a fission explosion.

some technical hurdles

Drozdenko said, “I have no reason to dispute what other experts have said, which is that (the Iranians) were months away (from weapons grade) if that was their intention. But I think there is a lot of evidence that they did not intend to do that, and the negotiations were going very well.”

Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu has been issuing urgent warnings about the Iranian bomb for decades. Meanwhile, Iran’s rulers have insisted that Tehran has no interest in a bomb, and its supreme leader has even issued a fatwa outlawing nuclear weapons. haram, Or contrary to Islam.

It seems that the truth about Iran’s intentions is lost somewhere in between.

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran had an actual secret nuclear weapons program from 1989 to 2003, codenamed Amad. Iran halted the program but sought to retain the scientific capital and expertise it had already generated, Fetter said.

Scientists say Iran’s program after 2003 appears to be driven by a desire to generate and use diplomatic influence, meaning Iran was primarily interested in what it could get No Making bombs.

Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran received relief from sanctions – until the US lifted sanctions in 2018.

Under the JCPOA, Iran gave up its most enriched uranium, then 20 percent, and accepted a limit of 3.67 percent. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors had access to all Iranian nuclear sites and “effectively prevented the possibility that Iran could break out and develop nuclear weapons,” Fetter said.

He sees the Iranians’ enriching uranium “very slowly” over the past few years as an attempt to “maintain a bargaining advantage.”

new accounts

The remaining Iranian leadership need only look to the example of North Korea to see a country with actual nuclear weapons, rather than just centrifuges and raw materials, which has not been and is unlikely to be attacked.

Those in the Iranian regime who could argue that withdrawing from developing nuclear weapons would prevent attacks were discredited, or killed.

“I worry that this has changed the equation, the decision calculus, inside Iran,” Fetter said.

“The United States has not been a reliable partner in negotiations with them over the past 10 years,” Drozdenko said. “We went back on the agreement with them about this and while they were negotiating we started a war with them.”

Despite the enormous expense of developing a bomb and potential setbacks due to the destruction caused by war, Drozdenko said Iranian determination to achieve it could only be hardened.

Apart from Iran, other countries are also recalibrating their thinking on the cost-benefit ratio of nuclear weapons, he said.

Fetter says that, if the Islamic Republic survives, he doubts the US will be able to prevent reactivation of its nuclear program using satellite intelligence and airpower alone.

“I don’t understand how that’s possible. Iran is a very big country. There are a lot of trained scientists and engineers, there are a lot of potential places where you could find small-scale enrichment or conversion facilities.”

Israel had good human intelligence sources on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, as evidenced by its assassinations and other covert operations in the country. But it’s unclear how much of that infrastructure remains.

He said sending US troops into Iran to recover uranium is “extremely dangerous” and “unlikely to succeed.”

“Unless you can somehow destroy the technology, kill all the scientists and engineers, unless you’re willing to take over the country, I don’t see how you can destroy this capability,” he said.

“In fact, such missions are more likely to move Iran in the other direction: toward a commitment to rebuild the nuclear program.”